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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to U.C.A. § 782a-3(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Brief of the Appellant identifies two issues for review:
1.

Was the trial Court correct in disregarding respondent's Memorandum

which was mailed within the time allowed by the Court.
2.

Was the trial Court correct in denying respondent's Objection to

Memorandum Decision.
Brief of Appellant at 5.
With regard to the first issue, petitioner asserts that the issue is more properly
framed as follows:
Was the trial Court correct in disregarding respondent's
Memorandum which was mailed, but notfiled,within the
time allowed by the Court.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that since the "Order (1)
Granting Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to
Commissioner's Ruling; and (2) Denying Respondent's Objection to Memorandum
Decision and Request for Trial De Novo"" signed by the Court on May 5, 1998, provides
specifically in the Order that "[Respondent's objection is hereby denied and the
Memorandum Decision entered by Commissioner Garner herein is hereby confirmed as
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the order of this Court." (Record on Appeal 1269-1271, at 1270), the second issue to be
reviewed should be stated more properly as follows:
Was the trial Court correct in denying respondent's Objection
to Memorandum Decision and confirming the Memorandum
Decision entered by Commissioner Garner.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue identified for review, i.e., whether the trial court was correct in
disregarding respondent's Memorandum which was not filed within the ten day time limit
allowed by the order of Judge Judkins made in open court and in the presence counsel for
respondent (Record on Appeal at 1069-1070), is a decision which is committed to the
sound discretion of a trial judge and accordingly, the standard of review is whether the
action of the trial judge in striking respondent's memorandum and refusing to consider it
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Harper v. Summit County. 963
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Birth Hope Adoption Agency. Inc. v.Doe. 947 P.2d 859,
190 Ariz. 285 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, 1997); Mason v. Householder. 647 P.2d 980, 58 Or.
App. 192(1982).
The second issue identified for review, i.e., whether the trial court was correct in
denying respondent's Objection to Memorandum Decision and confirming the
Memorandum Decision entered by Commissioner Garner, is to be reviewed pursuant to a
mixed standard. In Utah, a divorce decree is to be interpreted according to established
rules of contract interpretation. Tavlor v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App.
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1998). The Court, in the Memorandum Decision of Commissioner Garner, confirmed by
Judge Judkins, found paragraph 4A(2)d of the Decree of Divorce to be susceptible to the
interpretation argued for by each of the parties, or, as commonly stated, to be ambiguous.
See, Record on Appeal 945-951, at 950. The determination by a court that a contract is
ambiguous is a threshhold question of law which is reviewed on a "correctness" standard.
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997); Interwest
Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996); Trolley Square Associates v.
Nielson. 886 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). After considering the extrinsic evidence
produced by both parties at the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Court ruled in favor
of the interpretation argued for and presented by petitioner. Since extrinsic evidence was
received and considered by the Court in determining the proper interpretation of
paragraph 4A2(d), the correct standard for review is whether the findings of the trial
court, based upon the extrinsic evidence it considered, were clearly erroneous. Interwest
Construction v. Palmer, supra, Hall v Process Instruments. 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995);
Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson. supra; Beesley v. Harris. 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah
1994).
The cases cited by respondent in support of a "correctness" standard as the
appropriate standard of review for all issues identified in this appeal are cases where the
trial court had granted summary judgment. (Brief of Appellant at 5). These cases do not
have any bearing on the legal and factual situations being reviewed in this case.
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STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The petitioner has identified the following statutes and rules of central importance,
which are cited in this Brief:
Utah Code Annotated § 78-7-5(4)
Utah Code Annotated § 78-7-17(3)
Rule 5(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 6-401, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
The full text of these rules is set forth in the Addendum
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner/Appellee, Daryl W. Hennick (as a result of the change in the
designations for parties in divorce proceedings to "petitioner" and "respondent" effective
July 1, 1997, hereinafter referred to as "petitioner"), respectfully submits the following
Statement of the Case:
1.

On or about February 27, 1990, pursuant to a written stipulation signed by

both parties (Record on Appeal at 08-14), the trial court entered a Decree of Divorce
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terminating the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Said Decree of Divorce was
final upon entry. (Record on Appeal at 49-54).
2.

On or about March 8, 1990, respondent, by and through her counsel of

record at that time, Stephen W. Jewell, filed a Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce
(hereinafter referred to as "Respondent's First Motion to Set Aside)(Record on Appeal at
65-66,67-75).
3.

On or about August 31,1980, the parties executed and filed a Stipulation

for Partial Resolution of Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce and for Entry of
Amended Decree of Divorce (Record on Appeal at 100-110).
4.

Pursuant to the Stipulation for Partial Resolution of Motion to Set Aside

Decree of Divorce and for Entry of Amended Decree of Divorce, on or about August 31,
1990, the Court signed and entered an Amended Decree of Divorce, which resolved by
stipulation all of the financial issues between the parties, but reserved for future
determination all custody and visitation issues (Record on Appeal at 174-183).
5.

On or about September 12, 1990, Stephen W. Jewell filed his Notice of

Withdrawal as counsel for respondent. (Record on Appeal at 194).
6.

On or about September 17, 1990, J. Bruce Reading, filed his Appearance of

Counsel, entering his appearance as counsel for respondent (Record on Appeal at 131132).
7.

On or about November 26,1990, the parties executed andfileda
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Stipulation for Final Resolution of Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce and for Entry
of Second Amended Decree of Divorce, which completely and finally resolved
respondent's pending Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce (Record on Appeal at 195203).
8.

On or about November 26, 1990, a Second Amended Decree of Divorce

(hereinafter "the Decree") was entered pursuant to the written stipulation of the parties,
which incorporated all of the financial terms which were agreed upon by the parties and
reflected in the Amended Decree of Divorce, and which awarded petitioner sole custody
of all of the minor children of the parties and specifically described respondent's
visitation rights, all as voluntarily agreed to by the parties in their written stipulation
(Record on Appeal at 232-243).
9.

Between November 26, 1990 and August 27, 1992, various proceedings

were held in this case, including, but not limited to, respondent's Order to Show Cause
and Declaration in re Contempt (Record on Appeal at 254-255), petitioner's Order to
Show Cause (Record on Appeal at 325-328), respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce and Motion for Order to Show Cause (Record on Appeal at 364) and Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (Record on Appeal
at 372-374).
10.

On or about August 27, 1992, J. Bruce Reading filed his Withdrawal of

Counsel, giving notice that he was withdrawing as counsel for respondent and that her

10

file had been turned over to Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. (Record on Appeal at 413-414).
11.

On or about September 10, 1992, Steven Kuhnhausen filed his Substitution

of Counsel giving notice that he would be representing respondent in all proceedings in
this matter (Record on Appeal at 415-416).
12.

On or about November 2, 1992, Steven Kuhnhausen filed his Withdrawal

of Counsel (Record on Appeal at 417).
13.

On or about December 3, 1992, Steven Kuhnhausen again filed an

Appearance of Counsel, indicating that he would "represent the above-named defendant
in all matters connected with the above entitled case."(Record on Appeal at 418-419).
14.

On or about October 23, 1996, respondent filed an Order to Show Cause

(hereinafter "respondent's OSC"), seeking, inter alia, judgment against petitioner for his
alleged failure to pay additional interest and principal allegedly due pursuant to paragraph
4A(2)d of the Second Amended Decree of Divorce (Record on Appeal at 695-697).
15.

On July 3, 1997, as a result of granting a motion filed by petitioner (Record

on Appeal at 704-709), the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable Daniel W.
Garner, Domestic Relations Commissioner, presiding, conducted an evidentiary hearing
with regard to respondent's OSC. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing,
Commissioner Garner allowed each of the partied to file supplemental written
memoranda, if they so desired, within ten days after that hearing (Record on Appeal at
862).
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16.

On or about July 14, 1997, respondent filed her "Memorandum of

Authorities and Law" dated July 14, 1997 (Record on Appeal at 952-960).
17.

On or about July 14, 1997, petitioner filed his "Supplemental Memorandum

of Points and Authorities Relating to the Hearing on Respondent's Order to Show Cause
dated October 23, 1996." (Record on Appeal at 879-895)
18.

On or about July 22, 1997, petitioner filed his "Memorandum in Response

to Respondent's Order to Show Cause dated October 23,1996." (Record on Appeal at
927-943)
19.

On or about August 28, 1997, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision

(Record on Appeal at 945-951).
20.

On or about September 12, 1997, respondent, by and through her counsel of

record, Don S. Redd, filed her "Objection to Memorandum Decision and Request for
Trial de Novo" (hereinafter "the Objection")(Record on Appeal at 961-963).
21.

On or about September 25, 1997, petitioner filed his "Motion to Dismiss

Respondent's Objection to Memorandum Decision and Request for Trial do Novo (dated
September 12,1997)" (hereinafter "petitioner's Motion to Dismiss") and his
"Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Objection to
Memorandum Decision and Request for Trial de Novo (dated September 12, 1997)",
alleging and arguing that in filing the Objection, respondent had failed to comply with the
requirements of Rules 6-401(4), 6-401(5) and 4-501(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial
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Administration, in that the Objection did not identify the "specific recommendations" on
which respondent was objecting (Rule 6-401(4)), did not "set forth reasons for each
objection"(Rule 6-401(4)) and did not submit a written memorandum in support of the
Objection (Rules 6-401(5) and 4-501(a))(Record on Appeal at 964-966, 967-981).
22.

In response to the filing of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, respondent, more

than seventeen (17) days after filing the Objection and without seeking leave of court,
respondent filed her "Memorandum in Support of Objection to Recommendation"
(hereinafter "respondent's Memorandum"), dated September 29, 1997 (Record on Appeal
at 984-985).
23.

On December 12, 1997, a hearing on petitioner's Motion to Dismiss was

held before the Honorable Clint S,. Judkins, at which time the Judge ruled in open court
and in the presence of counsel for respondent that he would not allow a trial de novo with
regard to respondent's Objection, that he would deny petitioner's Motion to Dismiss at
that time, that respondent's Memorandum did not comply with the requirements of Rules
6-401(4), 6-401(5) and 4-501 and that he would enlarge the time for filing by respondent
of an amended memorandum which complied with the requirements of the applicable
rules. Respondent was allowed ten (10) daysfromthe date of the hearing within to file, if
she chose to do so, an amended memorandum (Record on Appeal at 1069-1070, 11351138).
24.

On December 24,1997, respondent filed her Memorandum in Support of
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Objection to Commissioner's Ruling (hereinafter "respondent's Amended
Memorandum"), which was twelve (12) days after the hearing before Judge Judkins and
after the deadline which he had imposed for the filing of an amended memorandum
(Record on Appeal at 1076-1084).
25.

On or about January 5, 1998, petitioner filed "Petitioner's Objection to (1)

Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Objection to Commissioner's Ruling, and (2)
Affidavit o Stephen Jewell", arguing that respondent had not filed her Amended
Memorandum within the time frame ordered by Judge Judkins (Record on Appeal at
1085-1096).
26.

On April 21,1998, pursuant to notice, Judge Judkins held a hearing on

"Petitioner's Objection to (1) Respondent's Memorandum m Support of Objection to
Commissioner's Ruling, and (2) Affidavit of Stephen Jewell", and on respondent's
original Objection, dated September 12,1997 (Record on Appeal at 1148).
27.

After reviewing the written submissions of the parties, and hearing the

arguments of counsel which were presented at the hearing on April 21, 1998, Judge
Judkins entered an Order, which was signed on May 5, 1998, striking respondent's
Amended Memorandum because it was untimely filed, denying the Objection dated
September 12, 1997, and confirming the ruling reflected in the Memorandum Decision
entered by Commissioner Garner as the order of the Court.(Record on Appeal at 1148,
1266-1268).
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28.

On or about June 3, 1998, respondent filed her Notice of Appeal (Record

on Appeal at 1272).
Since respondent has not challenged any of the Findings of Fact made by
Commissioner Garner and has not presented any legal arguments against the
interpretation of paragraph 4A(2)d of the Decree of Divorce, petitioner has elected to not
set forth any additional facts which were elicited at the evidentiary hearing.
MOTION FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO RULE 33,
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Petitioner respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 33(c)(1), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (hereinafter "U.R.A.P."), for an award of damages, including an
award to petitioner of single or double costs, as defined by Rule 34, U.R.A.P., and/or
reasonable attorneys fees.
This motion is based upon the Record on Appeal, the Brief of the Appellant and
the Brief of Appellee, including, but not limited to, point of the Argument set forth
hereinafter, which, inter alia, reflect the following grounds for granting this motion:
1.

Respondent admits failing to comply with the Order of Judge Judkins

requiring respondent to file an amended memorandum in support of her Objection
within ten (10) days after the hearing held on December 12, 1997;
2.

Judge Judkins entered this Order after having found that respondent's

original Objection and the untimely Memorandum filed in support of the Objection
did not comply with the requirements of Rule 6-401(4) and 6-401(5);
15

3.

Rule 5(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the filing of documents

as "filing them with the clerk of the court".
4.

Respondent has cited no authority or other support for the proposition

that Judge Judkins misinterpreted Rule 5(e) or abused his discretion in enforcing
his prior order by striking and disregarding respondent's Amended Memorandum.
5.

Respondent did not order a transcript or designate any part of the record

from the trial court to be provided in support of this appeal.
6.

Respondent has not marshaled any evidence or identified any legal

authorities which suggest that the interpretation by Commissioner Garner, as
confirmed by Judge Judkins, of paragraph 4A(2)d of the Second Amended Decree
of Divorce was incorrect.
7.

The minimal argument presented by respondent does not cite in support of

her position any relevant legal authority or contain any citations to the Record on
Appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I - Judge Judkins appropriately determined that respondent's failure to
identify specific objections to the Memorandum Decision of Commissioner Garner,
combined with her failure to file a supporting memorandum was not in compliance with
Rule 6-401(4) and 6-401(5), U.C.J.A. After Judge Judkins gave respondent a second
chance to get it right and respondent failed to file her Amended Memorandum by the
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deadline imposed by court order, he was justified in striking and disregarding her
Amended Memorandum. Respondent has failed to provide this Court with any factual or
legal support for the proposition that Judge Judkins erred and absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion, this Court should affirm the order striking respondent's Amended
Memorandum.
Point II - Respondent has failed to brief the second issue identified in respondent's
statement of Issues Presented for Review and as a result of this failure by respondent, this
Court should not consider this issue.
Point III - Respondent's brief and this appeal are both frivolous within the meaning
of Rule 33(a) and 33(b), U.R.A.P., in that respondent has failed to present any relevant
and appropriate support for its assertions of error and has filed a brief which is deficient
and noncompliant. As a result, petitioner should be awarded damages pursuant to Rule
33, U.R.A.P.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ACTED WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION IN STRIKING AND DISREGARDING
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF HER OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM DECISION
Respondent argues that Judge Judkins acted improperly in striking respondent's
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Commissioner's Ruling, which was filed with
the Court on December 24, 1997 (Brief of Appellant at pages 7-9). Respondent further
17

argues that Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "U.R.C.P."), requires that
the Court overlook any minor defects in the presentation of her case to the Court and that
to do otherwise would deny to respondent rights guaranteed to her by the constitutions of
the State of Utah and the United States of America. Unfortunately, respondent's
argument is misguided legally and factually.
The objection to Memorandum Decision and Request for Trial De Novo, which
was filed by respondent on or about September 12, 1997, did not comply with the
requirements of Rules 6-401(4), 6-401(5) and 4-501(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration (hereinafter "U.C.J.A."). These rules provide specific time and substance
requirements for objections to the recommendations of domestic relations commissioners.
Rule 6-401(4), U.C.J.A., provides as follows:
Any party objecting to the recommendation order shall file a written objection to
the recommendation with the clerk of the Court an serve copies on the
Commissioner's office and opposing counsel. Objections shall be filed within ten
(10) days of the date the Recommendation was made in open court, or if taken
under advisement, ten (10) days after the date of the subsequent written
recommendation made by the Commission. Objections shall be to specific
recommendations and shall set forth reasons for each objection. (Emphasis
supplied).
In addition, Rule 6-401(5), U.C. J. A., clearly identifies the procedure and
standard for judicial review of objections to commissioner's recommendations which
may be filed. It states:
Cases not resolved at the settlement or pre-trial conference shall be set for
trial on all issues not resolved. All other matters shall be reviewed in accordance
with Rule 4-501. (Emphasis supplied).
18

Respondent's Objection to Memorandum Decision and Request for Trial De Novo,
dated September 12, 1997, did not comply with the requirements of Rules 6-401(4), 6401(5) and 4-501(1 )(a) for the following reasons:
1.

It did not state objections to specific recommendations;

2.

It did not set forth any reasons for the general objection, let alone any

reasons for specific objections as required by 6-401(4);
3.

Rule 4-501 governs the procedure for filing and documenting of an

objection to a recommendation for a commissioner. It clearly requires that a
memorandum be filed. Respondent failed to file any memorandum at all with her
Objection dated September 12, 1997. On September 29, 1997, respondent did file a
Memorandum, but this was only after petitioner filed his Motion to Dismiss alleging
failure by respondent to file a memorandum as a reason why respondent's Objection
should be dismissed.
At the hearing held before on December 12,1997, Judge Judkins denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss respondent's Objection, but ruled that respondent's
belated Memorandum dated September 29, 1997, did not comply with the requirements of
Rules 6-401(4), 6-401(5) and 4-501(1 )(a), U.C. J. A., and gave respondent another
chance to get it right. However, respondent failed to file her Amended Memorandum
within the ten (10) day timeframeordered by Judge Judkins. See Rule 5(e) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure (mailing does not constitute filing). Accordingly, Judge Judkins was
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correct in his ruling that respondent had never complied with the requirements of his
Order of December 12, 1997, or with the plain and specific requirements of Rules 6401(4), 6-401(5) and 4-501(1 Xa), U.C.J.A.
As the record clearly reflects, Judge Judkins gave respondent an abundant
opportunity to file appropriate documents in support of her Objection to the Memorandum
Decision of Commissioner Garner. Although Judge Judkins found that respondent had
not complied with the requirements of Rule 6-401(4) and 6-401(5), U.C.J.A., at the
hearing held on December 12,1997, rather than dismiss the objection as requested by
petitioner, he allowed respondent an additional ten (10) days to file a compliant
memorandum. (Record on Appeal at 1135-1138). It was only after respondent failed to
file his revised Memorandum within the ten day period that he declined to consider it.
(Record on Appeal at 1148, 1266-1268). It is clearly within the authority and power of
the Court to establish deadlines and to enforce its own orders with appropriate sanctions.
U.C.A. §§ 78-7-5(4) and 78-7-17(3). In Barnard v. Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243 (Utah
1993), it was held that the power of a court to enforce its rules implies the existence of a
mechanism for enforcement. See also, State. In re M.S.. 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Isaacson v. Dorious. 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). One of the most common realities
in legal procedure is that rules and court ordersfrequentlyimpose deadlines and that
consequences flowfromthe failure to meet those deadlines. Respondent has not pointed
to any facts which suggest that Judge Judkins, after allowing respondent a second chance
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to comply with the rules governing the filing of an objection to the recommendation of a
domestic relations commissioner, was abusing his discretion in striking and disregarding
the memorandum which respondent had filed untimely.
Respondent's reliance upon Rule 61, U.R.C.P. is misplaced. Rule 61 does not
reflect an admonition to the trial court to ignore its own orders, but rather it is a direction
to the reviewing court to consider upon review only errors made by the trial court which
had a substantial impact on the outcome of the case. 11 Wright & Miller §2881 at 441443. See, Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997). Contrary to respondent's
assertions, she had her day in court, including a complete evidentiary hearing where she
testified, called third party witnesses, cross examined petitioner, submitted exhibits and
presented oral argument. In addition, Commissioner Garner allowed the submission of
supplemental memoranda. However, because respondent failed to file a compliant
memorandum when she filed her Objection on September 12,1997, and because she
failed to abide by the specific order of the Court with regard to the deadline forfilingher
Amended Memorandum, she lost her opportunity to have her written arguments
considered by the Court. Similar rules exist with regard to thefilingand content of
appellate briefs. See, inter alia, Rule 4(a), Rule 9(g), Rule 24(i), Rule 26(c) and Rule
27(d), U.R.A.P. Clearly, this type of ruling is within the sound discretion of the Court,
and absent any showing by respondent of any facts suggesting that the Court abused its
discretion, the action of Judge Judkins in striking and disregarding respondent's
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Memorandum should not be overturned by this Court.
POINT II
RESPONDENT HAS NOT BRIEFED THE SECOND
ISSUE IDENTIFIED FOR REVIEW AND THIS
COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER IT ON APPEAL
Respondent's brief does not marshal any facts, cite any relevant legal authorities,
make any legal arguments or otherwise provide any support for the second issue
identified in respondent's statement of the Issues Presented for Review, i.e., the
contention that Judge Judkins erred in denying respondent's Objection to Commissioner
Garner's Memorandum Decision, and in confirming the Memorandum Decision as the
order of the Court. The argument set forth in the Brief of Appellant focuses solely on
whether Judge Judkins acted improperly in striking respondent's Amended
Memorandum. Even though an issue may be mentioned in a brief, that issue will not be
addressed by an appellate court if it has not been briefed. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d
508, 515 (Utah Ct.App. 1996); Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197 (Utah Ct. App.
1996); State ex rel C.Y. v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Horton.
848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). Undoubtedly, one
of the reasons for this rule is, as in this case, where factual and legal arguments are not
articulated in the brief with appropriate citation to authorities and to the record on appeal,
it is impossible for the opposing party to respond or for the Court to render a decision.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider on appeal the second issue identified in the
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statement of Issues Presented for Review.
POINT III

RESPONDENT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 33 OF
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Rule 33(a), U.R.A.P., provides as follows:
. . . if the Court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages,
which may include single or double costs, as defined by Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorneys fees, to the prevailing party.
Rule 33(b), U.R.A.P., then defines what constitutes a "frivolous" act within the
meaning of Rule 33(a), as follows:
For the purposes of these rules, afrivolousappeal, motion, brief, or other
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law.
Although this rule is to be applied only in egregious cases, Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), this rule has been applied by this Court in several cases. See,
Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Porco v. Porco. supra;
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. HalL 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); O'Brien
v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987). It is not necessary to show that there was a lack of good faith on the part of
the filer of the appeal or brief. O'Brien v. Rush, supra.
In Eames v. Eames. supra, it was held that where an appeal was takenfroman
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order distributing property and awarding alimony in a divorce case, and the appellant
mischaracterized and misstated the facts and the law governing the issues in the case, and
it was determined that there was no basis for the argument presented by the appellant, the
appeal was "frivolous". In this case, similar circumstances exist. Respondent filed an
appeal which allegedly was seeking review of two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred
in striking her Amended Memorandum, which wasfiledafter the deadline imposed by
specific court order; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying her Objection to
Commissioner Garner's Memorandum Decision and confirming the Memorandum
Decision as the order of the court. However, respondent did not request a transcript or
designate the record as required by Rule 11, U.R.A.P. Respondent did file a brief, but the
brief is noncompliant and deficient in at least the following significant respects:
1.

Respondent's Statement of the Case does not include any citations to the

record and isfilledwith unsupported, inaccurate, immaterial, emotional and scandalous
assertions and statements. See, Rule 24(a)(7), Rule 24(e) and Rule 24(i), U.R.A.P.
2.

Respondent's Brief does not contain a Summary of Argument. See, Rule

24(a)(8), U.R.A.P.
3.

The Argument set forth in Respondent's Brief does not include any

citations to the record. See, Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P.
4.

The Argument set forth in Respondent's Brief does not include any

factual or legal arguments whatsoever with regard to the second issue identified in
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respondent's statement of the Issues Presented for Review, i.e., whether the trial court
erred in denying respondent's Objection and in confirming the Memorandum Decision of
Commissioner Garner as the order of the Court.
5.

The Argument set forth in Respondent's Brief does address the propriety of

the ruling of Judge Judkins striking and disregarding respondent's Amended
Memorandum. However, this argument fails to make any citations to the record and
marshal any facts in support of her position. The only legal authorities cited by
respondent in support of her contention that Judge Judkins erred are Rule 61, U.R.C.P.,
Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert 402 P.2d 407, 16 Utah 2d 407 (Utah
1987), and various provisions of the constitutions of Utah and the United States.
However, as set forth above, these authorities have no application to the facts and legal
circumstances of this case and respondent's reliance upon and assertion of them flies in
the face of common sense.
Accordingly, this Court should determine that this appeal and the Brief of
Appellant are bothfrivolousbecause respondent has not presented any appropriate and
relevant legal or factual basis for her assertions that the court erred and because the
arguments presented are not supported by any facts, have not been supported by the
citation of existing statutes, rules or case law, and no effort has been made to make a good
faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
CONCLUSION
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Judge Judkins, after patiently allowing respondent a second opportunity to comply
with the requirements for filing an objection to the recommendation of Commissioner
Garner was entirely justified in striking respondent's Amended Memorandum and in
ruling on the merits of the Objection by confirming the Memorandum Decision of
Commissioner Gamer. As indicated above, none of the facts relating to Judge Judkins
procedural ruling are contested by respondent and her legal arguments are inapplicable.
Further, respondent has failed to make any argument whatsoever with regard to her
assertion the Judge Judkins erred in denying her Objection and in confirming the
Memorandum Decision of Commissioner Gamer as the order of the trial court.
Accordingly, this Court should sustain the ruling of the trial court in all respects,
determine that respondent's Appeal and her brief are frivolous, and award petitioner his
costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 33 and 34, U.R.A.P.
Respectfully submitted.
Dated: M a r c h ? ? ! 1999

</J~ fdtUAl
H. Russell Hettinger
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the Brief of the Appellee
were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 7Z- day of March, 1999, to the following:
Don S. Redd, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant and Respondent
44 North Main Street
Layton, Utah 84041
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78-7-5. Powers of every court.
Every court has authority to:
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person
authorized to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding;
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter;
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or
proceeding, as provided by law;
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties;
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and
justice;
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.

78-7-17. Powers of every judicial officer.
Every judicial officer has power:
(1) to preserve and enforce order in his immediate presence, and in
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official
duty;
(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law;
(3) to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding before
him in the cases and manner provided by law;
(4) to administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before him,
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of his
powers and duties.

Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by
the court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every
pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar
paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(2) No service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except
as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default proceedings). Pleadings asserting new or
additional claims for relief against a party in default shall be served in the
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest,
attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is
named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an
answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or
possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made and by whom.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made
upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a
copy to the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the
clerk of the court. Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the
attorney or to the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or
person in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be served
has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service
by mail is complete upon mailing.
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it;
(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be
served by the party preparing it; and
(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an
unusually large number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies
thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim,
counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense
contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties
and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff
constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall be
served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. Except where rules of judicial administration prohibit the filing
of discovery requests and responses, all papers after the complaint required to
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or within a
reasonable time after service. The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate
of service showing the date and manner of service completed by the person
effecting service.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the
clerk of the court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk.
(Amended effective September 4, 1985; January 1, 1987; November 1, 1997.)

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted.by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.

R u l e 4-501. M o t i o n s .
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary
relief.
Statement of t h e Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph
(D(d)ofthis rule.
(C) Reply memorandum.
The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party
files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary
judgment.
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that

contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence
or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs
(3)(b) or (4) below.
(B) In cases where the granting 01 a motion would dispose of the action or
any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion
may file a written request for a hearing.
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) t h a t the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively
decided.
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and
notify all parties of the date and time.
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November!, 1996.)

Rule 6-401. D o m e s t i c relations commissioners.
Intent:
To identify the types of cases and matters which commissioners are authorized to hear, to identify the types of relief which commissioners may
recommend and to identify the types of final orders which may be issued by
commissioners.
To establish a procedure for judicial review of commissioners' decisions.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court commissioners serving in
the District Courts.
S t a t e m e n t of t h e R u l e :
(1) T^ypes of cases and matters. All domestic relations matters filed in the
district court in counties where court commissioners are appointed and
serving, including all divorce, annulment, paternity and spouse abuse matters,
orders to show cause, scheduling and settlement conferences, petitions to
modify divorce decrees, scheduling conferences, and all other applications for
relief, shall be referred to the commissioner upon filing with the clerk of the
court unless otherwise ordered by the Presiding Judge of the District.
(2) Authority of court commissioner. Court commissioners shall have the
following authority:
(A) Upon notice, require the personal appearance of parties and their
counsel;
(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure statements and proposed
settlement forms by the parties;
(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from the Division of Family Services
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 62A-4-106, or through the private sector;
(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue, including a
recommendation for entry of final judgment, in domestic relations or spouse
abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings;
(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or responsive pleading, a
certificate based upon the facts available at that time, stating whether there is
a legal action pending or previously adjudicated in a district or juvenile court
of any state regarding the minor child(ren) in the current case;
(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after notice to all parties or their
counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings consistent with paragraph (3)(C) below;
(G) Impose sanctions against any party who fails to comply with the
commissioner's requirements of attendance or production of discovery;
(H) Impose sanctions against any person who acts contemptuously under
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-32-10;
(I) Issue temporary or ex parte orders;
(J) Conduct settlement conferences with the parties and their counsel for
the purpose of facilitating settlement of any or all issues in a domestic relations
case. Issues which cannot be agreed upon by the parties at the settlement
conference shall be certified to the district court for trial; and
(K) Conduct pretrial conferences with the parties and their counsel on all
domestic relations matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding judge.
The commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under consideration at the pretrial and submit those recommendations to the district court.
(3) Duties of court commissioner. Under the general supervision of the
presiding judge, the court commissioner has the following duties prior to any
domestic matter being heard by the district court:
(A) Review all pleadings in each case;
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district court that appear to require a
hearing before the district court judge;

(C) Except in cases previously certified to the district court, conduct hearings with parties and their counsel for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court,
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile court regarding previous or
pending proceedings involving children of the parties, and
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available
(4) Objections With the exception of pre-trial orders, the commissioner's
recommendation is the order of the court until modified by the court Any party
objecting to the recommended order shall file a written objection to the
recommendation with the clerk of the court and serve copies on the commissioner's office and opposing counsel Objections shall be filed within ten days of
the date the recommendation was made in open court or if taken under
advisement, ten days after the date of the subsequent written recommendation
made by the commissioner Objections shall be to specific recommendations
and shall set forth reasons for each objection
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the settlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on all issues not resolved All other matters shall be
reviewed in accordance with Rule 4-501
(6) Prohibitions
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic relations
matters
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges m any matter,
except as provided by Rule of the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 15, 1995.)

R u l e 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and m the order indicated
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority, and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court, or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule
(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition m the court
below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is
necessary under this paragraph The addendum shall be bound as part of the
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum is
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents The
addendum shall contain a copy of
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief,
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion, in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service, and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction
(b) Brief of the appellee The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied

(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person/ "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(0 Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(g) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(h) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(i) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
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Rule 33. D a m a g e s for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's
fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages,
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the
damages be paid by th§ party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the
purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass,
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit
only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the
appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other papet\
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall
issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why
such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth
the allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten
days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The
order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.

